

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

42-41

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control
Rec'd:

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OCTOBER 24, 1962
12:58 A.M.

IO

Info FROM: NEW YORK

SS TO: Secretary of State

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SP NO: 1432, OCTOBER 23, MIDNIGHT

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SAL CUBA - CORRIDOR REACTIONS

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1. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) 4

2. NINCIC (YUGOSLAVIA) SAID

3. KURAL (TURKEY) SAID

4. SEN. GORE BRIEFED CHAKRAVARTY (INDIA) IMMEDIATELY AFTER LATTER HAD HEARD STEVENSON SPEECH IN SC. SENATOR UNDERLINED GRAVITY OF THREAT TO US POSED BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES, NECESSITY OF ACTING QUICKLY BEFORE FURTHER DELIVERIES COULD BE EFFECTED. CHAKRAVARTY DID NOT PROBE, BUT PROMISED TO PASS ON SENATOR'S POINTS TO HIS GOVT.

5. CONCENSUS NUMBER AFRICANS WE TALKED TO WAS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE PROOF ON OUR PART THAT THESE ROCKETS IN CUBA REALLY THREATEN THE US.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

(Pb) (u)

DATE

25/10/62

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424 1432, OCTOBER 23, MIDNIGHT FROM NEW YORK

THEY ARE ALSO WONDERING WHY WE BLOCKADED FIRST AND WENT TO UN SECOND. HOWEVER, ONCE REASON IS EXPLAINED TO THEM, THEY TEND TO COME AROUND QUICKLY. AFRICANS APPARENTLY WANT TO BE HELPFUL BUT HAVE CONFUSED IDEA AS TO WHAT WOULD BE HELPFUL SUCH AS PROPOSING WE PUT OFF APPLYING BLOCKADE UNTIL UN TEAM OF INSPECTORS CAN REACH CUBA; THAT WE OFFER TO DRAW BACK FROM OUR MOST ADVANCED BASES IF RUSSIANS WILL GET OUT OF CUBA; THAT WE AND RUSSIANS SIGN PLEDGE TO LIMIT CONFRONTATION TO "SHOOTING" RATHER THAN NUCLEAR WAR.

5. JACOVIDES (CYPRUS) []

6. MORRISSEY (IRELAND) []

7. DIMITSAS (GREECE) []

8. BERNARDIC (YUGOSLAVIA) []

[] WE SAID, HOPEFULLY THEY WOULD TURN AROUND AND GO HOME BUT IF NOT MAYBE THERE WOULD BE SOME SHOOTING.
HE SAID []

10. TABIBI (AFGHANISTAN) []

[] WE POINTED OUT THAT THEY HAD THROWN DOWN THE GAUNTLET AND THAT WE HAD NO RECOURSE BUT TO REACT STRONGLY, WHICH HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE BEFORE. WE HAD TO REACT WHEN IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO AVOID SHOOTING IF THEY WISHED. HE ASKED []

[] WE RAN THROUGH GAMUT OF DIFFERENCES, STRESSING TWO US BASES - PAN AND PAK STAN IN NORMAL SENSE THAT WORD.

STEVENSON

ST. NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/SD, 10/24. TEM.